By: Michael A. Simons
In the early morning hours of May 26, 1980, William Payton
committed three brutal and senseless attacks. He first raped
and murdered Pamela Montgomery, stabbing her twelve times with a
butcher knife. He then attacked and attempted to kill
Patricia Pensinger and her 10-year-old son Blaine, stabbing them
over sixty times. Charged with capital murder, there was
little Payton could do to contest his guilt. But he did argue
that he did not deserve to die. Interestingly, Payton did not
present the usual evidence in mitigation. Payton focused
solely on his conduct after the crime. Specifically,
Payton argued that he should not be executed because while in
prison awaiting trial he had found God, had become a committed
Christian, and had begun helping other inmates with their
spirituality. The prosecutor, on the other hand, argued that
Payton’s conduct after the crime—and his religious conversion in
particular—was irrelevant to his punishment. The jury
sentenced Payton to death. Now, twenty-three years later, this case
will go before the Supreme Court where the decision will be made:
should the defendant’s death sentence stand? Although the
issue before the Court is a technical one, the case of William
Payton raises broad questions regarding the death penalty,
retribution, and religion.
After examining these questions and their implications from both
utilitarian and retributivist perspectives, the author concludes
that evidence of religious conversion after conviction is relevant
in capital sentencing. The available empirical evidence
suggests that a repentant religious conversion is relevant because
juries consider such a conversion to be an important mitigating
factor. And whether such a conversion is viewed as an “ethical
transformation” or as “atonement,” punishment theory explains why
it should be relevant. The central point remains: an
authentic religious conversion is legally, practically, and morally
relevant to capital sentencing, but only if it begins with
repentance and culminates in atonement (or at least
expiation).