By: Elizabeth Rose Schiltz
In recent decades, proponents of a strand of feminist theory
variously referred to as care feminism, cultural feminism, or
relational feminism have been arguing for a social re-evaluation of
what has traditionally been regarded as women's work - the care of
dependents, such as children and elderly or disabled family
members. As part of that project, a number of feminists have
suggested that the traditional liberal theory of justice, based on
the ideal of autonomous, independent actors, should be rejected, or
at least revised, to reflect the reality of dependency in the life
of every individual.
A number of writers have begun to explore the application of a
dependency-based theory of justice in other contexts. In her recent
book, Re-Imagining Justice (2001), legal scholar Robin West placed
the dependency-based theory into a more general theory of justice
with applications that extend beyond the concerns of women engaging
in caregiving. The philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre, in Dependent
Rational Animals (1999), after acknowledging his debt to the
feminist writers, went on to apply their insight to general systems
of moral philosophy. He argued that a recognition of the
inevitability of periods of dependency in all human lives
necessitates political and social structures that protect all
members of society unable to advocate for themselves due to various
conditions of dependency - children, people with disabilities, and
the aged.
I have argued elsewhere that the writings of Pope John Paul II
on women are in many significant ways compatible with much of this
emerging strand of feminist theory. In this article, I explore the
extent to which his writings support a general dependency-based
theory of justice, such as those being developed by West and
MacIntyre.
I conclude that the writings of John Paul not only support, but
significantly advance, the project of articulating a general
dependency-based theory of justice, with applications beyond the
context of supporting motherhood. Even proponents of a
dependency-based theory of justice who are not comfortable with the
vocabulary of faith used by John Paul might borrow from him certain
concepts that could be translated into secular vocabulary that
would strengthen their arguments: acceptance of gender-based
distinctions in gifts and perspectives that support arguments to
restructure the workplace to allow fuller participation of women; a
recognition of the full spectrum of human dependency conditions
entitled to protection under this theory; and acknowledgment that
the human condition of dependency might justify a right of
dependents to receive care, as well as a right of care givers to
provide care. At the same time, proponents of a dependency-based
theory of justice who are motivated by faith convictions must
acknowledge the persuasive power of many of the arguments presented
by dependency-based theorists in purely secular terms such as those
of West and MacIntyre.
I end the article with some preliminary thoughts about how the
dependency based theory of justice might be applied to two concrete
areas of law - disability rights and consumer protection.