By: Scott Budzenski
In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The RLUIPA
represents, among other things, a Congressional attempt to protect
prisoners’ religious rights. Section 3 of the RLUIPA declares
that “no government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution.” Opting not to define what conduct qualifies as
a “substantial burden,” Congress’s attempt to protect prisoners’
religious rights was left largely to judicial interpretation.
Circuit courts across the country have disagreed as to what
constitutes a “substantial burden” within the meaning of the
RLUIPA. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
declined to address the issue. Recently, in Adkins v.
Kaspar, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit added its
interpretation of “substantial burden” under the RLUIPA to the
already unworkable list of definitions employed by courts across
the country. The Adkins case could have provided the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve the disagreement among
the lower courts but, unfortunately, the Court denied
certiorari.
This Comment sets forth that the Fifth Circuit along with
several other courts of appeals across the country have erred in
interpreting the RLUIPA. Part I gives a brief history of the
events leading to the enactment of the RLUIPA and outlines the
relevant terms of the statute. Part II charts the circuit
dispute that has developed under the RLUIPA. Part III
identifies the flaws in the various circuit court approaches and
endeavors to create a standard for “substantial burden” under the
RLUIPA that remains consistent with congressional intent.
Part IV applies what this Comment identifies as the correct
standard under the RLUIPA and argues that the Fifth Circuit should
have reversed the lower court in Adkins. Finally,
this Comment concludes by arguing that a Supreme Court standard is
necessary to put an end to the circuit dispute and vindicate
prisoners’ rights.